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Abstract—Key establishment in sensor networks becomes a
challenging problem because of the resource limitations of the
sensors and also due to vulnerability to physical capture of
the sensor nodes. In this paper, we propose an unconditionally
secure probabilistic group-based key pre-distribution scheme for
a heterogeneous wireless sensor network. The proposed scheme
always guarantees that no matter how many sensor nodes are
compromised, the non-compromised nodes can still communi-
cate with 100% secrecy, i.e., the proposed scheme is always
unconditionally secure against node capture attacks. Moreover,
it provides significantly better trade-off between communication
overhead, computational overhead, network connectivity and
security against node capture as compared to the existing key
pre-distribution schemes. It also supports dynamic node addition
after the initial deployment of the nodes in the network.
Keywords: Key management; Key pre-distribution; Security;
Polynomial-based key distribution; Random pairwise keys
scheme; Large-scale heterogeneous sensor networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a wireless sensor network a large number of tiny com-
puting nodes, called sensors, are deployed for the purpose
of sensing data and then to bring the data back securely to
nearby base stations. The base stations then preform the costly
computation on behalf of the sensors to analyze the data sensed
by the sensors. Due to resource limitations of the nodes and
also due to the vulnerability of physical captures of the nodes,
the traditional public key cryptographic techniques such as
RSA [1], Diffie-Hellman key exchange [2], El Gamal cryp-
tosystem [3], etc. are too much complicated and energy con-
suming. The symmetric ciphers such as DES, AES, RC5 [4],
[5] are then the viable options for encrypting/decrypting secret
data. In order to use symmetric cipher, we need to establish
pairwise keys between communicating sensors. But setting up
symmetric keys among communicating nodes remains till now
a challenging problem. A survey on sensor networks can be
found in [6].
In order to establish pairwise keys between neighboring
sensor nodes, a protocol is used known as the bootstrapping
protocol. A bootstrapping protocol has the following three
phases, called the key pre-distribution phase, the direct key
establishment (shared key discovery) phase and the path key
establishment phase. Before deployment of nodes in a target
field, the key setup server (usually the base station) performs
the key pre-distribution phase. In this phase each sensor node
is loaded by a set of pre-distributed keys in its memory. The
next phase occurs immediately after deployment of nodes in
the target field. After deployment, the direct key establishment
phase is performed by nodes in order to establish direct pair-
wise keys between them. To establish pairwise keys between
nodes, each node first discovers its neighbor nodes in its
communication range. Two nodes u and v are called physical
neighbors if they are within communication ranges of one
another. In order to discover physical neighbors, each node
broadcasts a HELLO message containing its own ID. Thus,
each node also receives HELLO message from its neighbor
nodes. In this way, each node prepares a list of neighbor nodes
which are basically the physical neighbors. Two physical
neighbors u and v are called key neighbors if they share one or
more key(s) in their key rings pre-loaded before deployment
during the key pre-distribution phase. Finally, nodes u and
v can secretly and directly communicate with one another
if and only if they are both physical and key neighbors. In
this case nodes u and v are termed as direct neighbors. The
final phase known as the path key establishment phase is an
optional stage and, if executed, adds to the connectivity of
the network. Suppose two physical neighbors u and v could
not able to establish a pairwise key during the direct key
establishment phase because of the fact that they do not share
any common key(s) in their key rings. In this phase, a secure
path is discovered between u and v and a fresh pairwise key
k is sent securely along that path. Thus, nodes u and v use
this path key k for their future secret communications.
Several symmetric key pre-distribution techniques [7], [8],
[9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14] are proposed in the literature.
Most of these schemes are not scalable and also they are
vulnerable to a small number of captured nodes in the network.
In this paper, we propose a probabilistic group-based key pre-
distribution scheme based on a heterogeneous wireless sensor
network (HWSN). Our scheme makes use of pre-deployment
locations of sensors in order to significantly enhance network
performances as compared to those for the existing key pre-
distribution schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes briefly the related works. In Section III, we introduce
our proposed scheme which is a probabilistic group-based
key distribution scheme applied in a heterogeneous wireless
sensor network. Section IV gives performance analysis and
security analysis of our scheme. Section V discusses the
simulation results of our scheme. In Section VI, we compare
the performances of our scheme with the existing related
schemes. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Eschenauer and Gligor in 2002 first proposed a random key
pre-distribution scheme [7]. Their scheme, henceforth referred
to as the EG scheme, consists the following three phases. In
the key pre-distribution phase, the (key) setup server chooses
a pool K of M randomly generated symmetric keys. Each
key is assigned a unique identifier in the pool K. For each
sensor node u to be deployed, the setup server picks a random
subset Ku of size m from the pool K and loads this subset
into its memory. This subset Ku is called the key ring of
the node u. After the sensor nodes are deployed in some
target field, a direct key establishment phase (also called the
shared key discovery phase) is performed by each sensor
node in the network. To establish a secret key between them,
they exchange the key ids from their key rings in plaintext.
If there is a common key id between their key rings, the
corresponding key is taken as the secret key between them
and they use this key for their future secure communication.
Nodes which discover that they have a shared secret key
in their key rings then verify that their neighbor actually
holds the key through a challenge-response protocol. Since
the random subsets for the nodes are drawn from the pool K
randomly without replacement, the same key may be used for
secret communication by several pairs of neighbor nodes in
the network. The path key establishment phase is an optional
stage, and if executed, adds to the connectivity of the network.
Suppose two neighbor nodes u and v fail to establish a
secret key between them in the direct key establishment phase,
but there exists a secure path. Once such a secure path is
discovered, u generates a new random key k and securely
transmits it along this path to the desired destination node v.
In this way, u and v can communicate secretly and directly
using k. However, the main problem is that the communication
overhead increases significantly with the number h of hops.
For this reason, in practice, h is restricted to a small value, say
2 or 3. An improvement of the path key establishment phase
has been proposed in [15], called the key reshuffling scheme,
which improves the network performances significantly as
compared to those for the path key establishment phase.
The q-composite scheme proposed by Chan et al. [8] is
one of the modifications of the EG scheme. In this scheme,
two neighbor nodes require at least q common keys (q > 1)
instead of one in order to establish a secret key between them.
The q-composite scheme enhances the security against node
capture significantly as compared to that for the EG scheme
if the number of captured nodes is small.
In the multipath key reinforcement scheme proposed by
Chan et al. [8], the main idea is to strengthen the security
of an established link key by establishing the link key through
multiple paths. This method can be applied in conjunction
with the EG scheme to yield greatly improved resilience
against node capture attacks by trading off some network
communication overhead.
The random pairwise keys scheme proposed by Chan et
al. [8] is described as follows. Let m be the size of the key ring
of each sensor node and p the probability that any two nodes
be able to communicate securely. In the key predistribution
phase, a total of n = m
p
unique node identifiers are generated.
The actual size of the network may be smaller than n. For each
sensor node to be deployed, a set of m other randomly distinct
node ids is selected and then a pairwise key is generated for
each pair of nodes. The key is stored in both nodes’ key rings
along with the id of the other node that also knows the key. In
the direct key establishment phase, each node broadcasts its
own id to its neighbor nodes in its communication range. Two
neighbor nodes can then easily verify the id of a neighbor
node in their key rings. If the id of a neighbor node is
found in a node’s key ring, they share a common pairwise
key for communication. A cryptographic handshake is then
performed between neighbor nodes for mutual verification of
the common key. Since the pairwise key between the two
nodes is generated randomly, no matter how many nodes are
captured by an adversary, the other non-compromised nodes
communicate with each other with 100% secrecy. Thus, the
random pairwise keys scheme provides unconditional security
against node capture attacks. However, this scheme degrades
network connectivity when the network size is large.
The polynomial-based key pre-distribution scheme proposed
by Blundo et al. in [16] is described as follows. In the key pre-
distribution phase, an offline key setup server assigns unique
identifiers to all the sensor nodes to be deployed in a target
field. The setup server then generates randomly a t-degree
symmetric bivariate polynomial f(x, y), defined by f(x, y) =∑t
i,j=0 aij x
i yj , where the coefficients aij (0 ≤ i, j ≤ t)
are randomly chosen from a finite field Fq = GF (q), q is
a prime that is large enough to accommodate a symmetric
cryptographic key, with the property that f(x, y) = f(y, x).
For each sensor node u to be deployed, the setup server
computes a polynomial share f(u, y). We note that f(u, y)
is a t-degree univariate polynomial. The setup server finally
loads the coefficients of yj of f(u, y) in the memory of
the sensor node u. In the direct key establishment phase,
each sensor node u first locates its physical neighbors in
its communication range and broadcasts its own id to its
neighbors. Let u and v be two neighbors. After receiving the
id of the node v, u computes the secret key shared with v as
ku,v = f(u, v). Similarly, v computes the secret key shared
with u as kv,u = f(v, u). Since f(u, v) = f(v, u), we have
ku,v = kv,u. Thus, both the nodes u and v store the key ku,v
for their future secret communication. The advantage of this
scheme is that any two neighbor nodes can establish a secret
key using the same symmetric bivariate polynomial f(x, y),
and there is no communication overhead during the pairwise
key establishment process. The main drawback is that if more
than t nodes in the network are compromised by an adversary,
he/she can easily reconstruct the original polynomial using
Lagrange interpolation [17]. As a result, all the pairwise
keys shared between the non-compromised nodes will also be
compromised. Thus, this scheme is unconditionally secure and
t-collusion resistant. Although increasing the value of t can
improve the security property of this scheme, it is not feasible
for wireless sensor networks due to the limited memory in
sensors.
Liu and Ning’s polynomial-pool based key predistribution
scheme [18] improves security considerably as compared to
that for the polynomial-based key pre-distribution scheme,
the EG scheme, and the q-composite scheme. The location-
aware closest pairwise keys scheme (CPKS) based on the
random pairwise keys scheme and closest polynomials pre-
distribution scheme (CPPS) based on the polynomial-pool
based scheme [12] improve significantly the performances
of network connectivity and resilience against node capture
when the deployment error between the actual location and
the expected deployed location of sensor nodes is smaller. The
group-based key pre-distribution scheme proposed by Huang
et al. [19] is a matrix based key distribution scheme. Their
scheme requires less number of keys preinstalled for each
sensor and is resilient to selective node capture attack and
node fabrication attack. Liu and Ning proposed a group based
key pre-distribution scheme [20] which performs better than
the existing schemes [7], [8], [9]. The deterministic group
based key pre-distribution scheme proposed in [21] improves
significantly better performances as compared to other existing
key pre-distribution schemes [7], [8], [9], [12], [13], [14].
The low-energy key management scheme (LEKM) [13]
and improved key distribution mechanism (IKDM) [14] are
proposed in hierarchical WSNs. These schemes have better
performances than the random key distribution schemes [7],
[8], because hierarchical structure has used for those schemes.
LEKM requires less key storage overhead than the random
schemes [7], [8]. The main drawback of LEKM is that once
a cluster head in a cluster is captured, all the keys in sensors
of that cluster are compromised. Though IKDM requires only
two secret keys to be stored in each sensor’s memory, once
a cluster head in a cluster is captured after the network
initialization phase, all the keys stored in sensors in that cluster
are compromised. The basic problem in LEKM and IKDM is
that all the sensors in a cluster communicate directly with the
cluster head only.
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we first describe in brief the network model
used for developing our scheme. We then describe the main
motivation behind development of our scheme. Finally, we
describe our proposed scheme.
A. Network Model
In this section, we discuss a heterogeneous network model
which will be used for development of our proposed scheme.
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Fig. 1. A heterogeneous wireless sensor network (HWSN) architecture.
A heterogeneous wireless sensor network (HWSN) is shown
in Figure 1. From this figure, we see that there is a hierarchy
among the nodes based on their capabilities: base station,
cluster heads and sensor nodes. Sensor nodes are inexpensive,
limited capability and generic wireless devices. Each sensor
has limited battery power, memory size and data processing
capability and short radio transmission range. Sensor nodes in
a group (also called a cluster) communicate among each other
in that cluster and finally communicate with the cluster head
(CH). Cluster heads have more resources than sensors. They
are equipped with high power batteries, larger memory storage,
powerful antenna and data processing capabilities. Cluster
heads can execute relatively complicated numerical operations
than sensors and have much larger radio transmission range.
Cluster heads can communicate with each other directly and
relay data between its cluster members and the base station.
A base station or sink node (BS) is typically a gateway to
another network, a powerful data processing/storage center, or
an access point for human interface. A base station collects
sensor readings, performs costly operations on behalf of sensor
nodes and manages the network. In some applications, the base
station is assumed to be trusted. Thus, the base station is used
as key distribution center (KDC).
Sensor nodes are deployed around one or more hop neigh-
borhood of the base station. Since the base station is most
powerful node in the network, it can reach all the sensor
nodes in that network. Depending on the applications, the
base station (BS) can be located either in the center or at
a corner of the network. Data flow in such networks can be:
(i) pairwise (unicast) among sensor nodes, (ii) group-wise
(multicast) within a cluster of sensor nodes, and (iii) network-
wise (broadcast) from base station to sensor nodes.
B. Motivation
Our scheme is motivated by the followings. In many sensing
applications, connectivity between all sensor nodes is not
necessary. Thus, data centric mechanism should be performed
to aggregate redundant data in order to reduce the energy
consumption and traffic load in wireless sensor networks.
Therefore, the heterogeneous network model has more opera-
tional advantages over the distributed homogeneous model for
wireless sensor networks due to inherent limitations of sensors
on power and processing capabilities.
The random pairwise keys scheme [8] has the following
limitations. Though this scheme always provides unconditional
security against node capture, it provides very low network
connectivity in particularly when the network size is large. In
practice, the sensor network is assumed to be highly scalable
and hence the random pairwise keys scheme is not applicable
in large-scale distributed sensor networks.
The group-based deterministic key distribution mechanism
[21] based on bivariate polynomials provides very high net-
work connectivity and unconditional security against node
capture. But this scheme requires computational overhead due
to evaluation of a t-degree polynomial over a finite field Fq .
In this paper, we propose an energy efficient key distribution
scheme. Our scheme is an improved version of this group-
based deterministic key distribution mechanism [21] based a
heterogeneous network model (as shown in Figure 1) which
requires significantly low computational and communication
overheads in order to establish pairwise secret keys between
communicating nodes in a sensor network.
C. Our approach
As in [21], we consider a heterogeneous wireless sensor
network (HWSN) consisting of two types of sensors: a small
number of powerful High-end sensors (H-sensors) and a large
number of resource-constrained Low-end sensors (L-sensors).
H-sensors can execute relatively complicated numerical opera-
tions than L-sensors and have much larger radio transmission
range and larger storage space than L-sensor nodes. On the
other hand, L-sensors are extremely resource-constrained. For
example, the H-sensors can be PDAs and the L-sensors are the
MICA2-DOT motes [22]. We also assume that the target field
is two dimensional and partitioned into a number l of equal
sized disjoint groups (clusters). Each group will consist of a
group head GHi (here it is an H-sensor node) and a number
ni of L-sensor nodes. The number ni of regular sensor nodes
is to be taken in each deployment group so that the network
connectivity in each group is reasonably high. L-sensors are
to be deployed randomly in a group only and each group head
will be deployed in that group around the center of that group.
For our sake of simplicity, we call an L-sensor node as regular
sensor node. The base station (BS) can be located either in the
center or at a corner of the network.
The following assumptions are made while constructing our
protocol.
• After deployment of the nodes in a target field, each L-
sensor (regular sensor node) as well as H-sensor nodes
(group heads) are assumed to be static only.
• Base station is assumed to be trusted and it will never be
compromised by an attacker.
• An adversary can eavesdrop on all traffic, inject packets
and reply old messages previously delivered. If an adver-
sary captures a node, all the keying information it holds
will also be compromised.
Our scheme makes use of the existing polynomial-based
key pre-distribution scheme in order to establish pairwise keys
among group heads in a sensor network. We use the extended
version of the random pairwise keys scheme in order to
facilitate establishment of pairwise keys among regular sensor
nodes in a group.
Our scheme consists of the following phases.
1) Key pre-distribution phase: This phase is performed by
the (key) setup server in offline before deployment of the
sensor nodes in a target field. The steps involved in this phase
are as follows:
• Step-1: The setup server first assigns a unique identifier,
say idGHi to each group head GHi which will be
deployed in the target field. For each deployed regular
sensor node u, the setup server also assigns a unique
identifier, say idu.
• Step-2: The setup server then selects randomly a unique
master key, say MKGHi for each group head GHi. This
master key is shared between the group head GHi and
the base station only. The setup server also assigns for
each deployed regular sensor node u a unique randomly
generated master key, say MKu which is shared with the
base station only.
• Step-3: For each deployment group Gi, the setup server
generates a node pool, say Ni consisting of the IDs of
the group head GHi and the ni regular sensor nodes to
be deployed in that group.
• Step-4: For each deployed regular sensor node u in each
group Gi, the setup server selects a set Si consisting of
randomly chosen m node IDs from the corresponding
node pool Ni of that group Gi. Let the set Si be as Si =
{idv1 , idv2 , . . . , idvm}. We note that one of the IDs in
Si may be the ID of the group head GHi. Then for each
pair (u, vj), (j = 1, 2, . . . ,m), the setup server computes
the m key-plus-id combinations, say {(SKu,vj , idvj ), j =
1, 2, . . . ,m}, where SKu,vj = PRFMKvj (idu). Here
PRF is a pseudo random function proposed by Goldreich
et al. [23].
• Step-5: For all the m deployed group heads GHi (i = 1,
2, . . . , m), the setup server randomly generates a t-
degree bivariate polynomial f(x, y) ∈ Fq[x, y] over a
finite field Fq , with the property that f(x, y) = f(y, x),
that is, f(x, y) is symmetric such that t >> l. The reason
for choosing the degree of the polynomial f(x, y) to
be higher is that even if an adversary captures all the l
group heads in the network, the polynomial f(x, y) will
never be compromised. The setup server then computes
a polynomial share f(idGHi , y) for each deployed group
head GHi (i = 1, 2, . . . , m).
• Step-6: Since the group heads are H-sensors and are more
powerful nodes than regular sensor nodes, we can store
more keying information in their memory. For each de-
ployed group head GHi (i = 1, 2, . . . , l), the setup server
randomly selects a set S = {idw1 , idw2 , . . . , idwm′ }
from the node pool Ni corresponding to that group
Gi, where m′ ≥ m. Then for each pair (GHi, wj),
(j = 1, 2, . . . ,m′), the setup server also computes the m′
key-plus-id combinations, say {(SKGHi,wj , idwj ), j =
1, 2, . . . ,m′}, where SKGHi,wj = PRFMKwj (idGHi).
• Step-7: Finally, the setup server loads the following
information into the memory of each group head GHi
(i = 1, 2, . . . , l): (i) its own identifier, (ii) its own master
key MKGHi , (iii) the polynomial share f(idGHi , y)
computed in step-5, and (iv)m′ key-plus-id combinations
computed in step-6. Each deployed regular sensor node u
in the deployment group Gi is loaded with the following
information: (i) its own identifier, (ii) its own master key
MKu, and (iii) m key-plus-id combinations computed
in step-4. The loaded information in each regular sensor
node as well as group head are shown in Tables I and II.
TABLE I
KEY RING OF A REGULAR SENSOR NODE u IN ITS DEPLOYMENT GROUP Gi
idu
MKu
{(SKu,vj , idvj ), j = 1, 2, . . . ,m},
SKu,vj = PRFMKvj (idu)
TABLE II
KEY RING OF A GROUP HEAD GHi IN ITS DEPLOYMENT GROUP Gi
idGHi
MKGHi
f(idGHi , y)
{(SKGHi,wj , idwj ), j = 1, 2, . . . ,m
′},
SKGHi,wj = PRFMKwj (idGHi )
We note that a typical regular sensor node can store 200 keys
in its memory. Hence we take the value of m as m = 200,
whereas the value of m′ will be taken larger than m due to
large storage memory of group heads.
2) Direct key establishment phase: As soon as regular
sensor nodes are deployed randomly in their respective groups,
their first task is to locate the physical neighbors within their
communication ranges. Group heads in their groups locate
their physical neighbors which are the regular sensor nodes.
Group heads also locate their other group heads in their
communication ranges in the network.
In our direct key establishment phase, we have the
following two pairwise key establishment procedures: one is
the inter-group pairwise key establishment and other is the
intra-group pairwise key establishment. In the inter-group
pairwise key establishment, only group heads will establish
pairwise secret keys with their neighbor group heads. On the
other hand, during the intra-group pairwise key establishment
the regular sensor nodes will establish pairwise keys with
their neighbor nodes in their own deployment group, and
also the group heads will establish pairwise keys with their
neighbor regular sensor nodes in their own deployment group.
(a) Inter-group pairwise key establishment
If GHi and GHj be two neighbor group heads, they
can establish pairwise secret key by exchanging their own
ids idGHi and idGHj . After exchanging their ids, GHi
computes the pairwise secret key as f(idGHi , idGHj ) by just
evaluating its own polynomial share f(idGHi , y) at the point
y = idGHj . In a similar fashion, GHj computes a secret
key f(idGHj , idGHi) by evaluating its polynomial share
f(idGHj , y) at the point y = idGHi . Since the polynomial
is symmetric, so the shared secret key between the group
heads GHi and GHj is SKGHi,GHj = f(idGHi , idGHj ).
Finally, they store this key SKGHi,GHj for their future secure
communication.
(b) Intra-group pairwise key establishment
In this phase, we consider the following three cases:
Case I: regular node to regular node key establishment
In order to establish a secret pairwise key between two
neighbor regular sensor nodes, say u and v in a deployment
group Gi, they exchange their own ids idu and idv. Let the
ID of node v be resident in the key ring of node u. Then from
Table I, we note that u is sharing a pairwise key with node
v. Node u then informs node v that it is sharing a pairwise
key SKu,v. This notification contains the ID of node u with
a small request message. It is noted that this notification
never contains the exact key SKu,v. After receiving the
request from u, node v can easily compute the same pairwise
key SKu,v by computing PRF function with the help of
its own master key MKv and the ID of node u as SKu,v
= PRFMKv (idu). Node v then stores this key SKu,v for
future secret communication with the node u.
Case II: group head to regular node key establishment
In order to establish a secret key between a regular
sensor node u and its group head GHi which is within its
communication range, they need to exchange their own ids. If
the ID of node u is resident in the key ring of the group head
GHi, then it informs to u that it has a pairwise key shared
with u. This is done by sending a short notification containing
the ID of GHi to node u. After receiving this notification,
u can easily compute the shared secret pairwise key with
GHi as SKGHi,u = PRFMKu(idGHi) and store this key for
future communication with GHi. Now, if the ID of u is not
resident in the key ring of GHi, it is also possible that the
ID of GHi is resident in the key ring of node u. In this case,
u sends a short notification containing its own ID to group
head GHi. Then GHi computes the shared secret pairwise
key SKGHi,u with u as SKGHi,u = PRFMKGHi (idu) using
its own master key and the ID of node u. GHi then stores
this key for future secret communication with node u.
Case III: regular node to regular node key establishment with
help of another group head
This is a spacial case considered here. Assume that a regular
node was supposed to be deployed in its group Gi. But due
to some deployment error during deployment, it is deployed
to some other group, say Gj . It is then noted that u could not
able to establish secret keys with its neighbor regular nodes
in that group because it does not have any keying information
containing in that group. Therefore, we need for the node u to
establish pairwise keys with its neighbor nodes with the help
of the group head GHj in Gj as follows (as in [21]).
In order to establish a pairwise key between u and its
neighbor node v, node u sends a request containing of its
own id idu and a randomly generated nonce RNu. After
receiving such a request, node v generates a random nonce
RNv and sends a request consisting of its own id idv as
well as the id of u, idu, random nonces RNu and RNv
to its own group head GHj which is protected by its own
master key MKv. Then the group head GHj forwards this
request to its neighbor group head and finally this request
comes eventually to the base station. The base station first
validates this request by decrypting the request by the master
key MKv of the node v, because the base station has the
master key MKv of v. If the validation passes, the base
station then only generates a secret random key ku,v to be
shared by the nodes u and v. Then it makes two protected
copies: one for node u, EMKu(ku,v ⊕ idu ⊕RNu) and other
for node v, EMKv (ku,v ⊕ idv⊕RNv) where Ek(M) denotes
the encryption of data M using the key k. The first one is
sent to node u and the later copy is sent to node v via group
heads. Nodes u and v first decrypt their protected copies.
Node u retrieves the secret key ku,v using its own id and
its own random nonce RNu as ku,v = (ku,v ⊕ idu ⊕ RNu)
⊕(idu ⊕ RNu). Similarly, node v also uses its own id and
random nonce RNv in order to retrieve the secret key ku,v as
ku,v = (ku,v⊕idv⊕RNv) ⊕(idv⊕RNv). We also note that the
communication overhead is not much due to involvement of
the group heads during this process. In fact, such a scenario is
unlikely to occur, because the probability of having a smaller
deployment error is typically higher than the probability of
having a larger one when the nodes are randomly deployed
in a deployment group. In a similar fashion, node u can also
establish a secret key with the group head GHj if GHj is
neighbor of u.
3) Dynamic sensor node addition phase: In order to add a
new regular sensor node u in a particular deployment group,
say GHi, the key setup server assigns a unique id, say idu and
randomly generates a master key MKu for u which will be
shared with the base station only. Then the setup server selects
a set Si consisting of randomly chosen m node IDs from the
corresponding node pool Ni of that group Gi. Let the set Si
be as Si = {idv1 , idv2 , . . . , idvm}. We note that one of the
IDs in Si may be the ID of the group head GHi. Then for
each pair (u, vj), (j = 1, 2, . . . ,m), the setup server computes
the m key-plus-id combinations, say {(SKu,vj , idvj ), j =
1, 2, . . . ,m}, where SKu,vj = PRFMKvj (idu) and loads
these information in its memory.
After deployment in its own deployment group, it estab-
lishes secret keys with its neighbor nodes within its group as
described in the intra-group pairwise key establishment phase.
4) Dynamic group-head addition phase: We now consider
that a group head GHi in a group Gi is captured by an adver-
sary. Thus, we need to add a new group head, say, GH ′i in that
group Gi in order to replace that node GHi. In order to add
the group head GH ′i , the setup server assigns a unique id, say
id
GH
′
i
and a randomly generated master key MK
GH
′
i
which
will be shared with the base station only. The setup server
then randomly selects a set S = {idw1 , idw2 , . . . , idwm′ } from
the node pool Ni corresponding to that group Gi, where
m′ ≥ m. Then for each pair (GH ′i , wj), (j = 1, 2, . . . ,m′),
the setup server also computes the m′ key-plus-id combi-
nations, say {(SK
GH
′
i
,wj
, idwj ), j = 1, 2, . . . ,m
′}, where
SK
GH
′
i
,wj
= PRFMKwj (idGH′i
). The setup server loads the
following information in its memory: (i) the identifier id
GH
′
i
for GH ′i , (ii) randomly generated master key MKGH′
i
, (iii)
the polynomial share f(id
GH
′
i
, y), and (iv) m′ key-plus-id
combinations as computed above.
After deployment in the group Gi, the group head GH
′
i
establishes pairwise keys with its neighbor group heads using
the inter-group pairwise key establishment phase and with
the regular sensor nodes using the intra-group pairwise key
establishment phase.
IV. ANALYSIS OF OUR SCHEME
In this section, we analyze the network connectivity of
our scheme which is the probability that any two neighbor
nodes in a deployment group can establish a secret pairwise
key between them. We then discuss the resilience against
node capture of our scheme. Finally, we analyze the overhead
requirements for storage, communication and computation for
key establishment between two neighbor regular sensor nodes.
A. Network connectivity
From inter-group pairwise key establishment phase de-
scribed in Section III.C.2, we note that every group head
can establish a pairwise secret key with its neighbor group
heads in the network using its own polynomial share. Let
pgrouphead−grouphead denote the probability that a group head
can establish a pairwise secret key with its another neighbor
group head. Then, we have,
pgrouphead−grouphead = 1. (1)
Now, we will concentrate on the network connectivity in
each deployment group Gi (i = 1, 2, . . . , l). Let us first
consider the case where a regular sensor node u can establish
a pairwise key with its another neighbor regular sensor node v
in their group Gi. From intra-group pairwise key establishment
phase described in Section III.C.2, we see that u and v can
establish a pairwise key if any one of the following two events
occur:
E1 : the event that the ID of node u is resident in v’s key ring
E2 : the event that the ID of node v is resident in u’s key ring
Let p1 denote the probability that the id of a node will
be resident in another node’s key ring. Then we have p1 =
P (E1) = P (E2). The total number of ways to select m ids
from the pool Ni of size ni + 1 is
(
ni+1
m
)
. For a fixed key
ring of node u, the total number of ways to select key ring of
a node v such that key ring of v does not have the id of u is(
(ni+1)−1
m
)
=
(
ni
m
)
. Thus, we have,
p1 =
{
1−
(nim)
(ni+1m )
= m
ni+1
, if m < ni + 1.
1, if m ≥ ni + 1.
(2)
Let psensor−sensor be the probability that two neighboring
regular sensor nodes u and v can establish a pairwise key in
a group Gi. Then we have, psensor−sensor = 1− (probability
that none of u and v will establish a pairwise key). Hence,
psensor−sensor = 1− (1− p1)
2. (3)
We now consider the probability of establishing a pairwise
key between a group head GHi and its neighboring regular
sensor node u in a group Gi. Let p2 be the probability that
the id of u will be resident in key ring of GHi. Then it is
easy to deduce (as derived for p1) that
p2 =

 1−
(ni
m′
)
(ni+1
m′
)
= m
′
ni+1
, if m′ < ni + 1.
1, if m′ ≥ ni + 1.
(4)
If pgrouphead−sensor represents the probability that a key is
established between GHi and u in group Gi, we have
pgrouphead−sensor = 1− (1− p1)(1 − p2). (5)
Overall network connectivity in a group Gi: We note that each
group Gi contains at most ni regular sensor nodes and a group
head GHi. Thus, | Gi |= ni+1. Let each node have d average
number of neighbor nodes. We consider each group is an undi-
rected graph having ni+1 nodes, each node having the degree
d. Then the total direct communication links in the group
becomes the total number of edges in Gi which is equal to
(ni+1)d
2 . The total number of secure direct links formed in the
group Gi by the regular sensor nodes and the group head Gi
are ni×d2 ·psensor−sensor and d·pgrouphead−sensor respectively.
Thus, we have ni×d2 · psensor−sensor +d · pgrouphead−sensor
secure links out of the total (ni+1)×d2 direct links. Hence, the
overall network connectivity in Gi can be estimated as
poverall =
ni×d
2 · psensor−sensor + d · pgrouphead−sensor
((ni + 1)× d)/2
=
ni · psensor−sensor + 2 · pgrouphead−sensor
ni + 1
. (6)
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Fig. 2. Number of regular sensor nodes vs. network connectivity between
regular sensor nodes in a group Gi, with m = 200.
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Fig. 3. Network connectivity between a regular sensor node and its group
head GHi in a group Gi, with m = 200, ni = 500, 1000, and different
values of m′.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the network con-
nectivity among regular sensor nodes and the number of nodes
in a group. We assume that each regular sensor node is
capable of holding 200 cryptographic keys in its memory (i.e.,
m = 200). It is clear to see from this figure that network
connectivity increases when the number of regular sensor
nodes in group is smaller. We also note that even if the number
of regular sensor nodes reaches 1000, the network connectivity
between regular sensor nodes in that group remains high.
Figure 3 illustrates the network connectivity among a group
head and its neighbor regular sensor node in a group. Since
the group head is powerful node than regular sensors, loading
of an excessive amount of keying materials gives very high
network connectivity between that group head and its neighbor
regular sensor node.
B. Resilience against node capture
The resilience against node capture attack of a key distri-
bution scheme is measured by estimating the fraction of total
secure communications that are compromised by a capture
of c nodes not including the communication in which the
compromised nodes are directly involved. In other words, we
want to find out the probability that the adversary can decrypt
the secret communications between two non-compromised
nodes u and v when c sensor nodes are already compromised.
From our direct key establishment phase, we notice that
each group head GHi is given a t-degree polynomial share
f(idGHi , y) for establishing pairwise keys with its neighbor
group heads and the degree of this polynomial is greater than
the total number of group heads in the network. The pairwise
keys established by the group heads are different. Based on the
security of the polynomial-based key pre-distribution scheme
[16] even if an adversary captures all the group heads, he/she
could not able to compromise this polynomial.
Based on the security of the PRF function [23], if a node’s
master key is not disclosed, no matter how many pairwise
keys generated by this master key are disclosed, the task is still
computationally difficult for an adversary to recover the master
key as well as the non-disclosed pairwise keys generated
with different ids of sensor nodes. Since each pre-distributed
pairwise key between two regular sensor nodes, and a regular
sensor node and its group head are generated using PRF
function randomly, no matter how many nodes are captured,
the direct pairwise keys between non-captured nodes are still
secure. In other words, node compromise does not eventually
lead to compromise of direct pairwise keys between other
non-captured nodes, that is, any two non-captured neighboring
nodes communicate with 100% secrecy. Hence, our scheme is
always unconditionally secure against node capture attack.
C. Overheads
In this section, we only consider overheads required by the
regular sensor nodes, because they are resource-constrained.
From the key pre-distribution phase (described in Section
III.C.1) we see that every regular sensor node requires to store
its own master key as well as m key-plus-id combinations in its
memory. Thus, the storage overhead is mainly due to storing
m+ 1 keys.
A regular sensor node in a deployment group needs to
exchange a short request message containing its own id with
its neighbor node in that group in order to establish a pairwise
key between them, if the id of the neighbor node is resident
in its key ring. For the special case described in the direct key
establishment phase in Section III.C.2, if a regular node which
was expected to deploy in a group but during deployment
it is deployed in another group, it requires to establish a
pairwise key with its neighbor nodes in that group with the
help of group heads. Since the probability of having a smaller
deployment error is typically higher than the probability of
having a larger one when the nodes are randomly deployed
in a deployment group, such a situation is unlikely to occur
frequently. Thus, the communication overhead is mainly due
to transmission of a short request message.
In order to establish a pairwise key, a regular sensor node
needs to perform a PRF operation. Zhu et al. [24] pointed
out due to the computational efficiency of pseudo random
functions, the computational overhead of the PRF function is
negligible. Hence, the computational overhead of our scheme
is low as compared to that of computation of a t-degree
polynomial over a finite field Fq as in [16], [25], [21].
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we discuss the simulation results of network
connectivity in each group.
We have implemented our scheme in C. We have taken a
square deployment field for our simulation. The target field is
partitioned into l groups Gi (i = 1, 2, . . . , l), each of equal
size. For each group Gi, we have deployed a group head GHi
around the center of the group. The number ni of regular
sensor nodes is taken to be equal for each group. We deploy
the ni regular sensor nodes randomly in each group Gi. The
following parameters are considered for our simulation:
• The number of groups in the target field is l = 100.
• The number of regular sensor nodes deployed in each
group is ≤ 1000.
• The area of the deployment field is A = 1000m×1000m.
• The area of each group is 100m× 100m.
• The communication range of each regular sensor node is
30 meters.
• The average number of nodes for each node is ≤ 100.
We have simulated overall network connectivity for each group
and then taken the average overall network connectivity for
a group. Figures 4 and 5 show the relationship between the
simulated overall network connectivity in a group versus the
analytical overall network connectivity in that group, with
m = 200, and different values of m′. We observe that both
the simulation as well as analysis results tally closely.
VI. COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS SCHEMES
In this section, we compare security against node capture
of our scheme with that for the existing schemes.
The comparison of resilience against sensor node capture
between our scheme, the polynomial-based key distribution
scheme [16], the polynomial-pool based key distribution
scheme [18], the EG scheme [7], the q-composite scheme [8],
the low-energy key management scheme (LEKM) [13] and the
improved key distribution mechanism (IKDM) [14] are shown
in Figures 6 and 7. We assume that each sensor node is capable
of holding 200 cryptographic keys in its key ring. In LEKM
and IKDM, we have taken 100 clusters and we assume that
each cluster has 100 sensors, since all the sensors will directly
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Fig. 4. Average overall network connectivity of a group Gi, with m = 200
and m′ = 200.
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Fig. 5. Average overall network connectivity of a group Gi, with m = 200
and m′ = 300.
communicate to their group head only. The network connec-
tivity for all schemes is taken ≈ 1.00 with suitable choice
of their respective parameters. We note from these figures
that even if the number of captured sensor nodes is small,
the EG scheme, the q-composite scheme, the polynomial-
based scheme and the polynomial-pool based scheme reveal
a large fraction of total secure communication between non-
compromised sensor nodes in the network. We also see that
our scheme, LEKM and IKDM provide unconditional security
against sensor node capture. Since in our scheme a deployment
group can have 221 members including a group head (an H-
sensor node), our scheme supports large-scale network than
LEKM and IKDM with the same number of cluster heads
(group heads). As a result, though LEKM and IKDM provide
unconditional security against sensor node capture, they can
not still support a large network as compared to our scheme
with the same number of cluster heads (group heads).
Figure 8 shows the number of compromised sensor keys
vs. number of the compromised cluster heads (group heads)
during the network initialization phase. In LEKM and IKDM,
we assume that there are 100 sensors in each cluster and
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Fig. 6. Comparison of resilience against node capture among our scheme,
the EG scheme, the q-composite scheme, and LEKM.
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Fig. 7. Comparison of resilience against node capture among our scheme,
the polynomial-based scheme, the polynomial-pool based scheme, and IKDM.
100 cluster heads in a network so that they can support
10, 000 sensor nodes. In these schemes, all the sensor nodes
will communicate with the cluster head node in a cluster
directly. Since in our scheme, a deployment group can have
221 members including a group head (an H-sensor node),
our scheme supports 22, 000 regular sensor nodes. In LEKM,
any single cluster head’s capture could compromise the 100
sensors’ secret keys. From this figure, we note that no matter
how many cluster heads (group heads) are compromised in the
network initialization phase, our scheme and IKDM provide
perfect resilience against cluster head (group head) capture
attack. However, in LEKM, as the number of compromising
cluster heads increases the number of compromised sensor
keys also increases. Thus, we see that our scheme as well
as IKDM provide better security against cluster head (group
head) capture attack as compared to that for LEKM during
network initialization phase. But when the group heads are
captured after network initialization phase, all the keys in
sensors are compromised in case of LEKM and IKDM. Also,
recently Paterson et al. [26] presented two attacks on IKDM.
They showed that their attacks can result in the compromise
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Fig. 8. Number of compromised regular sensor keys versus number of the
compromised cluster heads (group heads) in the network initialization phase.
Here Ncluster−head(c) denotes the number of compromised keys in sensor
nodes after capturing c cluster heads (group heads).
of most if not all of the sensor node keys after a small
number of cluster heads are compromised. In our scheme,
only the keys of neighboring sensors of a group head will be
compromised. Thus, other sensors will be non-compromised
even the group head is compromised. Hence, our scheme
provides significantly better security against cluster heads
(group heads) capture as compared to that for LEKM and
IKDM.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed an energy-efficient prob-
abilistic group-based key distribution scheme for a large-
scale heterogeneous wireless sensor network. Our scheme
always guarantees that any two non-compromised nodes in
a deployment group can communicate each other with 100%
secrecy. Moreover, it provides significantly better security
against sensor node capture as compared to that for the
existing related schemes. Overall, we conclude that our scheme
has a better trade-off among network connectivity, security,
communication and computational overheads than the existing
related schemes. In addition, our scheme supports dynamic
regular sensor node addition as well as dynamic group head
addition after initial deployment in the network.
REFERENCES
[1] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. M. Adleman, “A method for obtaining
digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems,” Communications of the
ACM, vol. 21, pp. 120–126, 1978.
[2] W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman, “New directions in cryptography,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 22, pp. 644–654, 1976.
[3] T. ElGamal, “A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based
on discrete logarithms,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 31, pp. 469–472, July 1985.
[4] D. R. Stinson, Cryptography Theory and Practice, 3rd ed. Chapman
& Hall/CRC, 2006.
[5] R. L. Rivest, “The RC5 Encryption Algorithm,” in Proceedings of the
second International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption, vol. 1008,
1994, pp. 86–96.
[6] I. F. Akyildiz, W. Su, Y. Sankarasubramaniam, and E. Cayirci, “Wireless
sensor networks : A survey,” Computer Networks, vol. 38, no. 4, pp.
393–422, 2002.
[7] L. Eschenauer and V. D. Gligor, “A key management scheme for
distributed sensor networks,” in the 9th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communication Security, November 2002, pp. 41–47.
[8] H. Chan, A. Perrig, and D. Song, “Random key predistribution schemes
for sensor networks,” in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
Berkeley, California, 2003, pp. 197–213.
[9] D. Liu and P. Ning, “Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor
networks,” in Proceedings of 10th ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS), Washington DC, October 27-31 2003,
pp. 52–61.
[10] W. Du, J. Deng, Y. S. Han, S. Chen, and P. K. Varshney, “A key
management scheme for wireless sensor networks using deployment
knowledge,” in 23rd Conference of the IEEE Communications Society
(Infocom’04), Hong Kong, China, March 21-25 2004.
[11] W. Du, J. Deng, Y. S. Han, and P. K. Varshney, “A pairwise key pre-
distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks,” in ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security (CCS’03), Washington DC,
USA, October 27-31 2003, pp. 42–51.
[12] D. Liu and P. Ning, “Improving key pre-distribution with deployment
knowledge in static sensor networks,” ACM Transactions on Sensor
Networks, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 204–239, 2005.
[13] G. Jolly, M. Kuscu, P. Kokate, and M. Yuonis, “A low-energy key
management protocol for wireless sensor networks,” in Proceedings of
the Eighth IEEE International Symposium on Computers and Commu-
nication (ISCC’03), Kemer-Antalya, Turkey, June 30 - July 3 2003.
[14] Y. Cheng and D. Agrawal, “An improved key distribution mechanism
for large-scale hierarchical wireless sensor networks,” Ad Hoc Networks
(Elsevier), vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 35–48, 2007.
[15] A. K. Das, “A Key Reshuffling Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks,”
in International Conference on Information Systems Security (ICISS
2005), Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), vol. 3803, 2005,
pp. 205–216, Springer-Verlag.
[16] C. Blundo, A. D. Santis, A. Herzberg, S. Kutten, U. Vaccaro, and
M. Yung, “Perfectly-secure key distribution for dynamic conferences,” in
Advances in Cryptology- CRYPTO’92, LNCS 740, Berlin, August 1993,
pp. 471–486.
[17] F. B. Hildebrand, Introduction to Numerical Analysis, 2nd ed. New
York: Dover, 1974.
[18] D. Liu, P. Ning, and R. Li, “Establishing pairwise keys in distributed
sensor networks,” ACM Transactions on Information and System Secu-
rity, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 41–77, 2005.
[19] D. Huang, M. Mehta, D. Medhi, and L. Harn, “Location-aware key
management scheme for wireless sensor networks,” in Proceedings of
the 2nd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks SASN
’04, 2004, pp. 29 – 42.
[20] D. Liu, P. Ning, and W. Du, “Group-Based Key Pre-Distribution in
Wireless Sensor Networks,” in Proceedings of 2005 ACM Workshop on
Wireless Security (WiSe 2005), September 2005.
[21] A. K. Das and I. Sengupta, “An effective group-based key establishment
scheme for large-scale wireless sensor networks using bivariate poly-
nomials,” in 3rd International Conference on Communication Systems
Software and Middleware (COMSWARE 2008), 2008, pp. 9–16.
[22] C. T. Inc., “Wireless sensor networks,” http://www.xbow.com.
[23] O. Goldreich, S. Goldwasser, and S. Micali, “How to construct random
functions,” Journal of the ACM, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 792–807, October
1986.
[24] S. Zhu, S. Setia, and S. Jajodia, “LEAP+: Efficient Security Mechanisms
for Large-Scale Distributed Sensor Networks,” ACM Transactions on
Sensor Networks, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 500–528, November 2006.
[25] D. Liu and P. Ning, “Location-based pairwise key establishments for
static sensor networks,” in ACM Workshop on Security in Ad Hoc and
Sensor Networks (SASN ’03), October 2003, pp. 72–82.
[26] M. B. Paterson, R. Holloway, and D. R. Stinson, “Two attacks on a
sensor network key distribution scheme of Cheng and Agrawal,” in
Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2008, report 2008/326. [Online]. Available:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2008
